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ABSTRACT
What is the relationship between the performer’s body, the
instrument, the musical actions and their perception by an
audience? And how do they relate when the music is gen-
erated by abstract digital processes controlled through ac-
tions on technical control surfaces, or gestural, tangible in-
terfaces? This article investigates these questions by ex-
amining elements and concepts from physiology, the cog-
nitive sciences with an ‘enactive’ and phenomenological
perspective and from the point of view of an artistic per-
formance practice, which brings these elements together
on stage. In a broad arc the investigation covers instru-
mental and perceptual affordances, the physical senses of
the body, different levels of awareness, corporeal states and
modes of awareness, the senses of agency and intentiona-
lity, and the sense of movement inherent to music. Based
on these insights, the contradiction between the corporeal
space of performance and the abstract, codified domain of
the digital sound processes is revealed. By looking at the
prevalent metaphors, but also the interaction concepts and
models of control and their shortcomings, it becomes evi-
dent that they need to be refined, possibly based on the
perceptual and corporeal criteria developed here.
1. INTRODUCTION
The physicality and presence of the performer on stage is
a central characteristic of all performing arts. Apart from
social dimensions of the concert form and the culturally
charged space of the stage [1], the corporeality of the mu-
sician is one of the central anchors that help to constitute
the moment of performance both for the musician and the
audience. Presence in this context is more than the mere
physical occupation of space or the physical attendance
of an event. It is an attitude, which informs on a sub-
conscious level the intensity of the act of communication
that any performance represents [2, p. 171].
In this framework there are two possible points of view to
be adopted. From the first position, attempts can be made
to be objective and stand outside of the situation as much
as possible (objective distance). Traditionally, the obser-
vation and analysis would take the perspective of the audi-
ence or the spectators (interestingly the modalities of lis-
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tening and seeing are already implied in these terms). By
looking at the situation from the position of an observer,
the outer forms and expressive qualities, as well as the
musical contents of a piece and the effects they produce
on the perceiver can be analysed. In a concert this holds
true both for the auditory and visual domains, as well as
for the somatic-kinaesthetic sense modalities. When fo-
cusing on this latter modality as the channel of commu-
nication, which subtends the perception of presence and
enables emphatic participation for the public, corporeal ef-
fects of sharing a music performance become apparent.
The second perspective is subjective and can be regarded
as problematic. By taking the point of view of the cen-
tral actor, the performer, only individual perceptions and
subjective experiences – as opposed to inter-individually
verifiable ‘facts’ – can be retrieved.
However, and this shall be a central topic of this article,
the primary site of physicality in a performance is located
with the musician who is performing in front of and for
the public. Unless there is an explicit form of audience-
participation, the performance situation is intended to fa-
cilitate the expression by the musician and its perception
by the public. 1 This can be called the communication
space of the performance, which is framed by these two
positions. The performer(s) and the audience enter into a
coded situation of joint attention and common knowledge
[3], albeit in an asymmetrical manner.
The situation of the performer represents a unique set of
circumstances, which sheds a light not just on the disci-
pline of live music but in general on the divide between
music perception and its multimodal nature and the current
cultural practice of music consumption in technologically
mediated forms, for example through recordings.
From my point of view as a performing musician working
with Digital Music Instruments (DMIs) and gestural forms
of ‘interaction’, I have a number of questions that need to
be addressed, in order to more fully understand the im-
plications of my physicality during performance [4]. The
constellation described above applies to any form of (west-
ern) music performance. In computer music and other
technologically mediated forms of stage action, such as
video-augmented dance or theatre, an additional factor en-
ters into play. One of the core elements of music practice
fundamentally changes, thus adding to the complexity of
the situation. The instrument – the method for producing
sound – loses its rooting in the physical world and gener-
1 The flow in the other direction is not usually practiced, although it is
implied and present in any concert even before the applause.
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ates an additional space, which the musician has to nego-
tiate in addition to that of the stage. This is the invisible
and intangible domain of symbolic processes and number
manipulations that constitute digital sound generation. For
the player to fully interact with the instrument, a channel
from the physical to the symbolical domain is required, a
way of conveying intentions and executing actions that can
modulate or modify the sounding outcome. The instru-
ment – the outer shell or tangible object, the methods for
interacting it offers and the models for generating sound
it performs – has become fragmented and exists in more
than one modality, divided between physical characteris-
tics, sensorial affordances and abstract thought processes.
2. FOUNDATIONS
In this article, I investigate the inherently contradictory sit-
uation of performing music generated by digital processes
with the gestural abilities and the perceptual foundations
given by our bodies. By juxtaposing concepts from eco-
logical psychology with an ‘enactive’ and phenomenolo-
gical position in philosophy and practical experiences in
artistic processes, I hope to gain insights into the core ele-
ments and forces at play in this abstract yet potentially ex-
pressive form of performing art. In order to frame this po-
sition in a concrete statement about ‘embodied action’ con-
sider this statement by Varela, Thomson, and Rosch: “By
using the term embodied we mean to highlight two points:
first that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience
that come from having a body with various sensorimotor
capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor
capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompass-
ing biological, psychological, and cultural context. By us-
ing the term action we mean to emphasize [...] that sen-
sory and motor processes, perception and action, are fun-
damentally inseparable in lived cognition. [...] the enactive
approach consists of two points: (1) perception consists
in perceptually guided actions and (2) cognitive structures
emerge from recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable
action to be perceptually guided.” [5, p. 173] For a mu-
sician, these perceptually guided actions occur naturally
when performing on an instrument. And that this involves
cognitive structures that were formed by repeated patterns
of engagement with the instrument, is evident when think-
ing of extended instrumental training. Where this com-
bination becomes interesting is when instrumental actions
cease to be exclusively perceptually guided and when cog-
nitive structures emerge that are informed less by percep-
tually guided actions than by conceptually structured per-
ceptions.
2.1 Affordances
Let’s look at the instrument and at what it offers to the
musician in addition to the production of sound.
The discourse within the last decade in design in general
and digital instrument development [6] in particular has in-
corporated the term ‘affordance’ that Gibson [7] defined
in terms of ecological potential, as that which an object
or environment is offering as actions or resources. “The
affordance of something does not change as the need of
the observer changes. The observer may or may not per-
ceive or attend to the affordance, according to his needs,
but the affordance, being invariant, is always there to be
perceived.” [7, pp. 138–139]
Gibson derives his concept from ‘Gestalt’ psychology’s
terms of valence, invitation and demand, but criticises that
its proponents used the concept in a value-free manner. He
emphasises the inherent meaning that arises out of ecolog-
ical embedding. “An affordance points two ways, to the
environment and to the observer. So does the information
to specify an affordance. [...] this is only to reemphasize
that exteroception is accompanied by proprioception – that
to perceive the world is to coperceive oneself. [...] The
awareness of the world and of one’s complementary rela-
tions to the world are not separable” [7, p. 141]
Unfortunately, in digital instrument building an amalga-
mation of concepts has been made, which simplifies this
concept and applies it only to the instruments and almost
exclusively to the potential actions, behaviours and sounds
they afford. My contention with this point of view is that
it ignores the impact an instrument – either physical or vir-
tual – has on the musician on the corporeal, pre-cognitive
and cognitive levels. If we want to understand the scope
of these objective affordances [8] that we can clearly ana-
lyse in traditional instruments, and that we have to deduce,
combine or extrapolate in dematerialised or technologi-
cally split instruments (DMIs), we also have to add the
concept of perceptual affordances that reside outside the
domain of the instrument, yet form part of the constella-
tion of its usage.
Perceptual affordance on a primary level could be de-
fined as the type of perceptions generated when entering
into contact with the instrument, without necessarily in-
teracting with it. These perceptions form a multi-modal
field that encompasses the traditional five senses of vision,
audition, touch, taste, smell. They arise when attentional
awareness is guided towards the instrument in any of the
sensory modes. An example for such an affordance would
be perceiving the tension of a drum skin when holding a
frame-drum.
On a secondary level, perceptual affordances could also
be seen as the potential for perceptions that arise out of the
interaction with the instrument. These secondary percep-
tions could be tied to the five senses as well, if they man-
ifest themselves within the outside perceptual field and in
direct relationship with the instrument. An example for
this affordance would be the sound generated from playing
the instrument, contained in the auditory event that arises
out of an instrumental action.
The perceptions or awareness that originates within the
player when interacting with the instrument, however, rep-
resents a separate type of perceptual affordance, which –
even though it is derived from contact and action with the
instrument – does not exist independently of cognitive or
pre-cognitive processes of the performer. The outer contact
with the instrument is conveyed by tactile and sometimes
vibro-tactile cues, an aspect research and instrument devel-
opments are pursuing. In contrast, the inner effects of con-
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tact with the instrument are based on a kind of sensing that
is active within the body, such as kinaesthetic, vestibular
and equilibrial sensing. These effects can not be called per-
ceptions by default, but rather belong to the pre-reflective,
pre-cognitive levels of our perceptual system. An exam-
ple of this type of affordance might be the level of comfort
or the complexity of physical adaptation an instrument de-
mands for its proper playing position, e.g. holding the vi-
olin clamped under the chin. Or the pre-conscious adapta-
tions to playing due to the perception of vibrational forces
transmitted through the body, such as the modulation of a
vibrato as felt through the changes in the vibrating string.
2.2 Object and Body Perception
Considering the performance of digital sounds through
physical actions and gestures, the question arises of how
the physical interface, the surfaces and action-space of the
instrument are perceived by the performer. When watch-
ing traditional instrument playing, an intuitive understand-
ing of the mechanics and actions of play is present, thanks
to a common acculturation process. And even if the in-
strument is unfamiliar, once the sound-production model
has been recognised, it is understood through extrapolation
from prior experiences.
For a performing musician the awareness of the instru-
ment happens through an object perception. The prime
exception to this rule are singers, for whom the instrument
and the body coincide and where instrumental actions have
a different scope. Yet even professional singers talk of their
‘voice’ as if it were a separate object that they manipulate
through technique [9].
Even though the instrument might be only peripherally
perceived, while the focus lies for example on the sound,
nevertheless this “object perception involves an experience
that is directed at the object. The relation at stake here is
[...] an intentional relation. [...] one necessary [...] condi-
tion is that the intentional relation involves the identifica-
tion of the object as something. To perceive involves the
ability to pick something out, to identify it as an object or
as a state of affairs in some minimal sense.” [10, p. 56] Re-
gardless of the simplicity or complexity of an instrument, it
is perceived as an object. Shifting the attention from sound
to sound production, e.g. by paying attention to the attack
of the bow, moves the intentional focus from an outer per-
ception of sound to an object perception of the instrument.
In both cases the instrument is peripherally present and the
awareness can at any time be moved onto this object. The
sense of touch provides a good case with which to illustrate
this. “Attention can be directed either proprioceptively or
exteroceptively, and it can be shifted from one to the other
[...] viewed as an alteration of the balance between focal
and peripheral awareness. [...] Even when the attention
is fixed firmly on the [...] dimension of tactile awareness,
the exteroception dimension remains [...] in background
awareness” [11, p. 139] By shifting the attention, the in-
strument, the musical content or even the body may move
to the periphery of the perceptual field or obtain the focal
attention as a ‘perceptual object’.
This is different for the perception of the body. We per-
ceive our bodies through an inner sense called propriocep-
tion and the kinaesthetic sense. We can become actively
aware of our body through these senses, for example when
paying attention to the position of our limbs, even if most
of the time this sense lies below the threshold of awareness.
In instrumental training direct perception of the body is
necessary but can prove to be an obstruction during perfor-
mance. However that doesn’t mean that while performing
there is no bodily awareness, since “it is also possible that
proprioceptive awareness can function as a non-perceptual
or non-observational self-awareness [...] and as such might
be regarded as a more immediate and more reliable form
of awareness than object perception.” [10, p. 54]
By understanding the interrelationship between the so-
matic and physiological layers of perception and the cog-
nitive processes deployed to interpret and act on them, an
essential part of the communicative aspects of corporeal
actions come to the foreground. This corporeal point of
view provides an anchor for a reflection on the awareness,
the recognition and interpretation of physical presence and
expression.
2.3 Levels of Awareness
What kinds of bodily awareness can a performing instru-
mentalist experience? The lowest level form the neurolo-
gical/physiological mechanisms of proprioception and the
somatic, kinaesthetic sense [12]. At this level, a large num-
ber of bodily signals are present and form a system that
allows an automatic control of posture, locomotion, and
physical actions adapted to specific tasks [13]. These ele-
ments together form the basis for the development of body-
schemata, which are “a system of sensory-motor capacities
that function without awareness or the necessity of percep-
tual monitoring.” [13, p. 24] Somatic and proprioceptive
awareness can take both a reflective and a pre-reflective
form, a distinction that is important for my argument in
the context of the performing electronic musician. If “the
first element of broad self-consciousness that somatic pro-
prioception provides is an awareness of the limits of the
body” [11, p. 149], then for the instrumentalist the physical
contact with the instrument provides a pre-reflective self-
awareness that is informed by the instrument, constitutes
an element of the sense of agency, and generates a clear
context for the bodily awareness [14]. A musician’s train-
ing aims at imprinting instrumental dimensions and shapes
as well as the sound-producing and controlling actions and
adaptations into extended body-schemata. They can be ex-
tended through habituation as shown by Merleau-Ponty in
his example of the woman with the feather in her hat [15, p.
165], and will be executed pre-reflectively during perfor-
mance. The intentional, object-related actions that are part
of playing the instrument build upon this pre-noetic know-
ledge without showing the necessity of making the body
experientially visible. “To be proprioceptively aware of
one’s body does not involve making one’s body an object
of perception [...] Proprioceptive-kinesthetic awareness is
usually a pre-reflective (non-observational) awareness that
allows the body to remain experientially transparent” [13,
p. 73].
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On the next higher level a peripheral awareness of the
body may be transformed into fully focused attention on
the body. Since the musician, through instrumental train-
ing, has achieved a fusion between body and instrument
in the domain of the body-schema, the perception will be
observational and begins to constitute a body-image. This
“body-image consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes,
and beliefs pertaining to one’s own body” [13, p. 24].
The level that follows involves the body only indirectly,
since it deals with musical awareness. A self-observational
awareness is in place, whenever a performance moment
occurs. Beyond the somatic or kinaesthetic feedback loop
that is guided by sensory-motor adaptations in the instru-
mental control, the auditive perception guides expressive
aspects of the performance through a different feedback
loop. “When the status of habituation is reached, the body-
image retreats into the background in order to enable the
concentration on the sonic-expressive shaping of the en-
tire piece of music, something to which the pre-reflective,
proprioceptive and auditive body-senses are continuously
subjected.” [16, p.111; author’s translation] This indicates
that a lower-level auditory process occurs, which is pre-
reflective and which forms part of an overarching musi-
cal awareness. Interestingly, the pre-reflective awareness
of musical elements can, again with habituation, sink to
the level of pre-reflective somatic proprioception and thus
close the loop between the musical awareness played out
on a metaphorical level [17] and the sensory-motor inte-
gration in the body.
2.4 Corporeal States and Modes of Awareness
In concordance with these findings and phenomenological
thinking, Legrand proposes the distinction between four
types of corporeal states: the invisible body is the body that
is absent from experience, the opaque body is the object
of an observational body experience; the transparent body
is experienced only ‘as one looks through it to the world’
and the performative body, finally, is based directly on a
pre-reflective experience of the body [18]. The former two
states are either ‘objective’ and observe the body as a sep-
arate entity or do not take the body into account at all. The
latter two modes implicitly connect the body with the ex-
perience, either as a foundational condition of perceiving
the ‘world’ or as a peripheral body experience below the
threshold of perception, a pre-cognitive awareness of one’s
own corporeal presence. It is precisely this duality which
permeates the situation of the performing musician: both
modes are active in anchoring the performance experience
at the same time. The listening to and continuous adap-
tation of the performance by the musician occurs through
the performative body, in the first person perspective. The
observational awareness, mindfulness and attention, which
is directed towards the musical elements, is framed by the
transparent body, either spatially or even socially.
A different model identifies three modes of consciousness
of self that are related to how explicit our self-awareness is
[19]. They reflect three main kinds of explicit knowledge.
The first mode corresponds to the performative body and
represents a state that is “embedded within the experience
of the environment, e.g. ‘affordance’, unreflective feeling
of location and movement in space, proprioceptive aware-
ness, feeling of acting. [...] Elements within the content
are explicit.” [19, p.659] The second mode is analogous to
the transparent body, which constitutes the frame through
which the world is perceived, without becoming explicit it-
self. This awareness presents the self as a subject and per-
ceptively “the content and the attitude are explicit”. Lastly,
in an analogy to the objective body the self becomes ap-
parent. The self-awareness is an element of reflection, and
“the content, the attitude, and the self are explicit” [19,
p.656].
Through the corporeal state of the performative body and
in an awareness mode of explicit content and attitude, the
concept of ‘performativity’ can be understood to apply
to the action in such a way that the sense of agency be-
comes an indispensable element that is constitutive of the
experience without becoming explicit. “This performative
awareness that I have of my body is tied to my embodied
capabilities for movement and action. [...] my knowledge
of what I can do [...] is in my body, not in a reflective or
intellectual attitude” [13, p. 74].
The physical actions of performing music on traditional
instruments and the control over the instrument and one’s
body occur predominantly in a pre-reflective performa-
tive body mode, which is guided by motor patterns and
body-schematic elements that are acquired as part of ex-
tended training and practising. These actions are based
on a knowledge about what the body can do, a knowledge
which is pre-reflective and situated in the body itself, not
on the conscious awareness of it. Thus the specific con-
trols of the body parts necessary to produce, sustain and
expressively control sound are all integrated on a level be-
low that of conscious control: “expressive movement [...]
is necessarily embodied – enabled and at the same time
constrained in specific ways by the structure and perfor-
mance possibilities of the motor system. Topokinetic prop-
erties of expressive movement 2 (and this includes, for ex-
ample, movement required to perform or respond to music)
still necessarily depend on some degree of body-schematic
functions” [13, p. 246]. Since the adaptive feedback con-
cerning both the auditive and the tactile or kinaesthetic
loops [16] continuously affect the performance at a pre-
reflective level, the body takes over most of the control,
running in a mode of performative awareness.
2.5 Agency and Intentionality
Apart from these levels of perception and consciousness
there are two other elements that form an essential part of
the musician’s interior perspective. The first is the sense
of agency, that is, “of oneself as the agent of action” or the
fact “that when I’m aware of my actions and experience
them as mine, I thereby experience myself: an experience
of myself as agent.” [20, p. 50] The sense of agency is
important for the higher level of self-awareness that is nec-
essary to perceive and maintain the perceptions and actions
that make up a controlled musical performance. The sec-
2 “Aspects of movement that have to do with precision in regard to
spatial location and accurate movement to targeted external points”
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ond element necessary for an interior perspective is that of
intentional control, something which becomes important
when addressing musical actions on devices and processes
that can potentially produce sound without any input from
the musician.
The same way as with the bodily awareness, which oc-
curs on physiological and somatic levels as pre-reflective
self-awareness, the sense of ownership and agency comes
from low-level processes that the body establishes to guide
actions: “the sense of ownership for actions depends on
sensory feedback for proprioceptive, visual tactile sources.
It is generated as action takes place. The sense of agency,
however, is based, in part, on pre-motor processes that hap-
pen just prior to the action.” [13] The bidirectional afferent
and efferent streams of sensory information are continu-
ously compared and integrated in the lower regions of the
brain and produce a regulatory feedback that forms part of
our awareness of actions. “To the extent that conscious-
ness enters into the ongoing production of action, and con-
tributes to the production of further action, even if signifi-
cant aspects of this production take place non-consciously,
our actions are intentional.” [13, p.238] So even if a large
part of fine-motor adaptations and body control remains
pre-reflective, a higher-level awareness of musical contents
fills the perceptual field of the performer. And as we saw
earlier, shifting the awareness focus from music to instru-
ment to body demands intentional investment, in particular
for paying attention to perceptions which would normally
occur below the threshold of awareness. A consequence
of how the sense of agency is constituted, is that a self-
determined action on stage creates a heightened level of
awareness, both on the pre-cognitive and cognitive levels,
thanks to a pronounced sense of agency and intentionality.
2.6 Music as Kinaesthetic Perception
Coming back to the dual perspectives outlined at the be-
ginning of this article, let’s examine briefly the audience’s
point of view, in order to better understand what it is they
perceive.
The exterior point of view in music perception is charac-
terised by the multimodal nature of sensory content. Even
though on the surface the entire event of a concert is opti-
mised for the undivided and intense auditory perception of
music, partaking in the physical presence and instrumen-
tal performance of the player forms a crucial part of the
experience for the spectator. The musician’s performance
and its expressive aspects are perceived as much through
the physical movements as through the sound, perceptions
that can occur visually or kinaesthetically. The music itself
is perceived aurally from its acoustic characteristics and
interpreted as an abstract subject that has its own agency
in an acoustic environment. The perceptual interpretation
based on listening alone is a translation from the aural do-
main into perceptual elements that can have spatial exten-
sion, position and displacements, imagined visual aspect
and may even generate tactile sensations. These elements
combine into a kinaesthetic perception that suggests actual
movement. “Music is perceived as dynamic in the sense
that the perceived properties evolve through time and gen-
The author performing gestural electronic music (under
Nikolai Tesla’s gaze at Troubleyn/Antwerp, May 2014). 3
erate in our perception segregated streams and objects that
lead, via the subjective sensing of the subject’s body mo-
tion, to impressions of movement, gesture, tensions, and
release of tension. [The] multi-sensory integration and sen-
sorimotor feedback” [21] that these cross-domain interpre-
tations are based on, provide both the performer and the
audience with the ability to recognise and empathise with
musical forms on a level of physical actions and gestures
as well as musical content.
3. TANGIBLE OBJECTS, INTANGIBLE
PROCESSES
The point of view from which this article is written stems
form a specific musical background, tradition and perfor-
mance practice. The style or type of performance with dig-
ital sound processes and gestural, movement-based actions
has its roots in the computer music and electro-acoustic
tradition that emerged from the 1960’s onward, but is also
inspired by open-form and improvisational approaches to
music, which are more closely related to subcultural, ex-
perimental, and even noisy forms of music. The gestu-
ral performance practice in electronic music involves the
use of technical interfaces and digital sound processes, a
combination which generates an inherent contradiction be-
tween the corporeal space of performance and the abstract,
codified domain of the digital sound processes.
A convincing example of this type of actions were the
gestural performances by Michel Waisvisz. 4 The ad-
vanced level of integration of his instrument with his body-
schematic processes and the inclusion of the affordances of
his instrument into his body-image was clearly discernible.
His style consisted of a mixture of instrumental control and
physical movement combined with direct treatment of vo-
cal sounds. It generated an expressive performance that in
my opinion appealed as much on the physical as on the
auditory level.
3.1 Instruments and Awareness
The focus in the argument presented her lies on this spe-
cific type of computer music practice and real-time gestu-
3 For videos of these performances see: http://www.jasch.ch/
island.html
4 Video can be found online on STEIM’s page http://www.
steim.org/michel/media.html and youtube http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=SIfumZa2TKYURI’s valid in April 2014.
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ral performance style. Yet, even when applied to other mu-
sical paradigms that are based on a different conjunction of
hardware with software, e.g. any modern smartphone, the
fundamental configuration of elements and their potential
for gestural action remains the same. What changes are on
the one hand the expertise of the user and on the other hand
the intended effect or outcome of the ‘interaction’.
The digital musical instrument (DMI) exists on the one
hand in an abstract, symbolic domain but on the other hand
needs to provide a tangible surface or interface suitable
for ‘interaction’ [22]. 5 By itself, this interface has no in-
trinsically compelling connection to the modes of sound-
production apart from the necessity to provide a gestural
and metaphorical action space. This connection is ‘com-
posed’ and reflects the affordances but also the conflict
between the tangible surface and the requirements of the
abstract sound process.
This contradiction poses the question about the possible
role of non-reflective instrument- and body-awareness dur-
ing such a performance, both for musician and audience.
Previously, the physical actions and adaptations that made
up instrumental playing were imprinted into the musician’s
body-schemata and corresponded closely with the instru-
ment’s physical, sonic, i.e. objective affordances as well
as its perceptual affordances in terms of cognitive and pre-
cognitive processes.
In DMIs, regardless of their complexity, only a limi-
ted number of affordances can correspond to body-
schematically acquired skills. And those that do are
generic and don’t correspond to the characteristics of tra-
ditional physical playing and coherent sound production
physics. As a consequence, this (pre-)cognitive dissonance
or discrepancy between affordances and action spaces, ob-
ject representations and actual instrument complexity may
lead to a break-down of bodily self-awareness and instru-
mental object-awareness during performance.
Gestural actions in the performance of electronic sound
can be considered to occur in a sort of expressive and per-
ceptual no-man’s land. The gap presented by the unknown
must then be bridged by the perceiver, who can only ex-
trapolate on the basis of prior experience. Thanks to her
physical presence and bodily actions, however, the corpo-
reality persists and permits the performer to project musi-
cal intentions, if not expressions, thanks to the shared bodi-
ly presence with the audience.
For the performer, the intentionality that is necessary to
play a traditional instrument remains unchanged, but the
sense of agency that the feedback through a non-reflective
body perception of physical sound production enables can
disappear or be diminished. For the audience, recognition
of instrumental actions may be inhibited, and other cultur-
ally guided or previously acquired individual experiences
may come to substitute the missing schema.
Both the performer and the audience remain exposed to
perception on the bodily level and thus have the opportu-
5 I deliberately put the term ‘interaction’ into quotes, because I believe
that for a true ‘interaction’ to occur, two subjects need to be present that
enter into an intentional and active exchange. I believe that most digital
music concepts today don’t fulfil this condition. Exceptions exist, but a
discussion of this issue will have to be the topic of a different article.
nity to share the experience. The instrumental gestures and
actions occur within the ‘world’ through a body and in re-
lation to an object or tool or instrument. And even if their
targeted effect should manifest itself through abstract digi-
tal processes, they are still informed by our innate and ac-
quired capabilities of acting through tools and instruments.
The British improvising guitarist Derek Bailey, although
active in a different style and aesthetics than that of com-
puter music and digital sound processes, put the role of the
instrument in a relevant manner when he said: “It is the
attitude of the player to this tactile element, to the physical
experience of playing the instrument, to the ‘instrumental
impulse’ which establishes much of the way he plays. One
of the basic characteristics of his improvising, detectable
in everything he plays, will be how he harnesses the in-
strumental impulse. Or how he reacts against it. And this
makes the stimulus and the recipient of this impulse, the
instrument, the most important aspect of his musical re-
sources. [...] The instrument is not just a tool but an ally.
It is not only a means to an end, it is a source of material,
and technique for the improvisor is often an exploitation of
the natural resources of the instrument.” [23, pp. 97–99]
What he describes is a relationship with the instrument that
is dialogic, ecological, and embodied, much in the way we
have seen exposed in Gibson’s concept of affordances.
3.2 Metaphors and Models
The continuous search for new ‘interaction’ models or new
interfaces indicates that there is a deficit in the quality of
the connection in a DMI between the action and gesture
domains, and the sound producing processes. Beyond the
attempt to resolve this problem by always adding new tech-
niques and tools, the question that should be asked is this:
can this deficit or conflict be converted into a fruitful ten-
sion and how?
The literature on musical gesture provides a rich set of
categorisations and classifications that deal mainly with
the types and effects of actions on musical instruments la-
beled as ‘gestures’. Delalande’s classification offers three
categories of ‘gesture’ ranging “from purely functional to
purely symbolic” [24]. Cadoz’ classification of the ‘ges-
ture channel’ differentiates between the three functions of
the ‘ergotic’ 6 , the epistemic and the semiotic, and or-
ders the instrumental ‘gestures’ in the three categories of
excitation, modification and selection [25]. Godøy for-
mulates the distinction between body-related and sound-
related ‘gestures’ [26], that Jensenius then categorises into
sound-producing, communicative, sound-facilitating and
sound-accompanying ‘gestures’ [27]. These authors all
take into account the bodily basis for these actions, some-
time also the perceptual effects, but the don’t address
the pre-reflective effects inherent to acting and perceiving
agency through the instrument.
Without going into the concepts of mapping [28] and sen-
sors, let’s examine a few basic principles of connecting the
physical world of actions and ‘gestures’ with the abstract
domain of digital sound processes.
6 “material action, modification and transformation of the environ-
ment”
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The representation of digital processes needs to occur in
metaphors, these processes are too complex to be grasped
and acted on directly while performing. We have visual
representations, such as the display of waveforms or spec-
trograms, physical metaphors, the levers, wheels, knobs
and slider and finally more all encompassing analog de-
vice metaphors such as tape-reels, patch-bays and signal-
chains. By themselves, these metaphors are useful, the
problem is their limiting effect on our cognitive and per-
ceptual capabilities, which we could mobilise better with
richer, more differentiated metaphors.
We also have a number of conceptual models about con-
trol of digital sound processes, which originate in real-
world scenarios and can therefore cognitively be handled
through behaviours shaped by everyday experiences. The
two main models of control are those of the instrument and
the cockpit. The first model builds on the instrument’s de-
pendence on continuous energy input to produce sound.
Rather than presenting mechanisms for generating larger
time-based structures, the instrument offers a palette of op-
tions, that need to be actively selected, combined and per-
formed by the musician. The second model of action puts
the performer into an observer perspective, where, from
a position of overview, single control actions keep the sys-
tem within the boundaries of the intended output, while the
sound processes produce their output without the need for
continuous excitation and control. A third and less com-
mon model is that of dialogical communication and inter-
action where generative aspects are part of the sound pro-
cesses. The most interesting manifestations of this model
generate an inter-subjective exchange with some form of
autonomous agent.
The types of ‘interaction’ and their position on the con-
ceptual axis, which ranges from direct parametric control
to ‘natural interaction’, depends on the level at which the
musician acts or ‘inter-acts’ with the digital domain. Dif-
ferent complexities demand different tangible objects or
instrumental interfaces.
In the case of one-dimensional and precise parametric
control, individual objects such as knobs, sliders or even
buttons are cognitively appropriate, since they represent in
their physical form the singular dimensional property of
the parameter and can be handled discretely.
In the case of higher-dimensional or model-based action
patterns, control objects with more degrees of freedom are
required. The manner of ‘interaction’ with more inter-
twined dimensions should reflect the relationship and de-
pendence of those degrees of freedom present in the digital
domain.
The most extreme example of entangled degrees of free-
dom that we can cognitively handle encompasses our en-
tire body. Leveraging this level of complexity, at least
through extraction of information about posture and kine-
matic qualities of the body, is attempted by the camera-
based motion controls for games, where full body move-
ments are used for control. This might be appropriate when
the goal is to affect a virtual body that mirrors the capabil-
ities of the natural body. It becomes problematic, how-
ever, when the correspondence between the actions in the
physical world and the result/reaction in the abstract dig-
ital domain is modelled after categories that originate in
the abstract domain. Empty-handed and movement-based
controls in an allocentric 7 frame work for metaphors of
control that reflects spatial qualities. Object-based, in-
strumental actions with tangible interfaces in an egocen-
tric 8 frame (for example with wearable sensors) or object-
centric frame are effective for actions on abstract entities
without clear correspondence in the real world. Digital in-
strument design and interface developments oscillate be-
tween these two poles. There is, however, a tendency
to shift away from action and behaviour patterns that are
based on the bodily capabilities shaped by object ‘inter-
action’ with physical instruments towards symbolic and
metaphorical projection onto a disjointed digital model.
4. MEANINGS
Having laid out these categories, models and attempts at
describing the possible connections between ‘embodied
action’ as a musician and symbolic abstract sound pro-
cesses, one important aspect should perhaps be brought
to foreground more explicitly: The multi-dimensional and
multi-modal nature of musical actions, gestures and per-
ceptions may correspond to the richness of the “flow-
ing manifold” [29] of consciousness that is built on pre-
cognitive or non-conceptual body perceptions. But the
metaphors, models and interfaces we chose in order to gen-
erate tangible musical instruments on top of abstract digi-
tal processes, possess nowhere near the refinement that is
needed to do justice to this richness.
The insurmountable distance and inherently unresolvable
contradiction between our perception, its pre-cognitive
sub-personal processes, the necessity to relate to objects
in a physical, physiological, somatic and kinaesthetic way
and the seemingly unlimited possibilities of connecting
bodily actions and abstract sound-production processes
might be one of the reasons why we are fascinated by this
digital performing arts discipline. But this might also be
why after an initial phase of interest, the difficulty arises
of how to give the musical actions a deeper meaning and
stronger impact, both for the performing musician and the
audience and spectator that witness and experience it.
A goal might be to generate a tighter link between the
corporeal actions that carry intentionality and perhaps even
expression and the medium of sound as generated by a
technically encoded process.
But in order to reach a next level of development of this
practice, we will need to achieve a deeper understanding
of how we relate pre-cognitively and in a corporeal way to
instruments and tools in general, and how this might alter
the way we envision the connection between actions of our
physical bodies and abstract sound processes in gestural
electronic music performance. After all: “The meaning
in and of the music is not verbal or linguistic, but rather
bodily and felt. We understand the meaning of longing,
desire, expectation for better things to come [...] We cannot
7 An outer spatial frame of reference
8 A spatial frame of reference anchored on oneself
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convey it verbally, but it is nonetheless meaningful, and it
is enacted via our active engagement with the music.” [30]
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